University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Engineering and Information
Sciences - Papers: Part A

Faculty of Engineering and Information
Sciences

1-1-2013

Scalable fragile watermarking for image authentication
Angela Piper
University of Wollongong, apiper@uow.edu.au

Reihaneh Safavi-Naini
University of Calgary, rei@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers
Part of the Engineering Commons, and the Science and Technology Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Piper, Angela and Safavi-Naini, Reihaneh, "Scalable fragile watermarking for image authentication" (2013).
Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences - Papers: Part A. 1839.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/1839

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Scalable fragile watermarking for image authentication
Abstract
Semi-fragile watermarks are used to detect unauthorised changes to an image, whereas tolerating
allowed changes such as compression. Most semi-fragile algorithms that tolerate compression assume
that because compression only removes the less visually significant data from an image, tampering with
any data that would normally be removed by compression cannot affect a meaningful change to the
image. Scalable compression allows a single compressed image to produce a variety of reduced
resolution or reduced quality images, termed subimages, to suit the different display or bandwidth
requirements of each user. However, highly scaled subimages remove a substantial fraction of the data in
the original image, so the assumption used by most semi-fragile algorithms breaks down, as tampering
with this data allows meaningful changes to the image content. The authors propose a scalable fragile
watermarking algorithm for authentication of scalable JPEG2000 compressed images. It tolerates the
loss of large amounts of image data because of resolution or quality scaling, producing no false alarms.
Yet, it also protects that data from tampering, detecting even minor manipulations other than scaling, and
is secure against mark transfer and collage attacks. Experimental results demonstrate this for scaling
down to 1/1024th the area of the original or to 1/100th the file size.

Keywords
era2015, image, watermarking, authentication, fragile, scalable

Disciplines
Engineering | Science and Technology Studies

Publication Details
Piper, A. & Safavi-Naini, R. (2013). Scalable fragile watermarking for image authentication. IET Information
Security, 7 (4), 300-311.

This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/1839

Scalable Fragile Watermarking for Image Authentication
Angela Piper* and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini∗†
February 14, 2012

Abstract
Semi-fragile watermarks are used to detect unauthorised changes to an image, while tolerating allowed changes such as compression. Most semi-fragile algorithms that tolerate compression assume that because compression only removes the less visually signicant data from
an image, tampering with any data that would normally be removed by compression cannot
aect a meaningful change to the image.
Scalable compression allows a single compressed image to produce a variety of reduced resolution or reduced quality images, termed subimages, to suit the dierent display or bandwidth
requirements of each user. However, highly scaled subimages remove a substantial fraction of
the data in the original image, so the assumption used by most semi-fragile algorithms breaks
down, as tampering with this data allows meaningful changes to the image content.
We propose a scalable fragile watermarking algorithm for authentication of scalable JPEG2000
compressed images. It tolerates the loss of large amounts of image data due to resolution or
quality scaling, producing no false alarms. Yet it also protects that data from tampering,
detecting even minor manipulations other than scaling, and is secure against mark transfer
and collage attacks. Experimental results demonstrate this for scaling down to 1/1024 th the
area of the original or to 1/100 th the le size.

1

Introduction

In this paper we consider watermarking for image authentication when scaling (resolution and
quality) must be tolerated. We assume scaling is performed using JPEG2000: a state-of-the-art
scalable compression algorithm.
∗ Angela
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A common way of providing protection against image tampering is to use watermarks.1 Fragile
watermarks are designed to be damaged by any changes to an image and changes to the image
can be detected and located. Fragile watermarks do not however tolerate compression and so this
severely limits their application, as images in most storage and communication systems are in
compressed form.

Semi-fragile watermarks are designed to be damaged by tampering but also to remain unchanged by a set of allowed operations that may include image compression. Compression tolerance is often obtained by excluding all image data which is expected to be lost during compression,
from the watermarking process. Although this ensures that the watermark will be correctly recovered from an untampered compressed image, it allows an attacker to tamper freely with and
data that has not contributed to the watermark. This means that semi-fragile watermarks that
are compression tolerant may not always be usable for image authentication.
Scalable compression systems allow an image to be compressed once but decompressed in a
variety of ways, to suit the network and display resources available to the user. Scalability is
commonly in the form of resolution or quality scalability. A fragile watermark that can support
these two types of scalability must remain detectable in all scaled versions of the image, but be
damaged by any other change to the image.
This paper presents a scalable fragile watermarking system, for use in image authentication in
which JPEG2000 [7] scalable compression is used. We use the term `scalable fragile' to emphasise
that only valid resolution or quality scaling operations are permitted, and so recompression is
not. This allows scalable compression to be used in the distribution of an image that is otherwise
intended to remain unmodied (see the motivating scenario in section 1.2). In particular, it ensures that minute tampering in the spatial domain, which necessarily involves decompression and
recompression, can be easily detected. In contrast, a semi-fragile algorithm will typically permit
recompression and often a variety of other operations, and thus will be much less sensitive to
tampering.

1.1

Challenges of Scalable Fragile Watermarking

In scalable compression systems such as JPEG2000, scalability is achieved through the production
of a base (lowest) layer, containing the data common to all versions, followed by one or more

renement (higher) layers, which are decoded as necessary to produce improved versions of the
1 The primary alternative is to use a digital signature, which allows the detection of changes to the image

but does not provide tamper location. Digital signatures are typically sensitive to single bit changes, which oers
stronger security, but traditionally do not tolerate compression (although cf. [3] and [13]). Furthermore, the separate
transmission of the signature data is unattractive in limited bandwidth environments.

image. For images, there are two main types of scalability. In resolution scalability, each additional
renement layer provides higher frequency image data, permitting the display of an image with
twice the horizontal resolution and twice the vertical resolution of the previous version. This allows
a user to download only the image data that is necessary for the display size of their device (g.
3c). In quality scalability, each additional renement layer provides more nely quantized image
data, producing an increase in visual quality. This allows a user to download the version of the
image that best ts their available network bandwidth (g. 3d). Resolution and quality scalability
provide the same functionality as resizing and recompression, using minimal storage overhead and
only a simple transcoding operation.
The most important requirement for scalable fragile watermarking is to ensure minimal false
alarms in a resolution or quality scaled image, i.e. tolerance to scaling. Most semi-fragile algorithms achieve their tolerance to rescaling through tolerance to recompression, and authentication
is obtained by only protecting the least acceptable compressed image. However such techniques
rely on the assumption that higher layers have negligible eect on image semantics and so tampering with data in those layers cannot aect the `meaning' of an image. This is a valid assumption
when only mild compression is tolerated. In many scalable compression scenarios, scalable compression must cater for a wide range of users: those with `high-end' devices and access to high
bandwidth, as well as users of `low-end' devices with small display size or bandwidth. To ensure
verication succeeds for the latter type of users, the watermark must remain acceptable under
severe reductions in resolution or quality. However the lowest resolution or quality layer is likely
to represent only a small portion of the full image that will be accessed by the high-end users.
This may provide an opportunity to the attacker to make meaningful changes to an image without
aecting the base layer, hence violating its authenticity.
Figure 1a shows an authentic image, with 6 resolution and 6 quality layers. Leaving the lowest
resolution layer untouched, we are able to change the text on the aeroplane (g. 1b). Leaving the
lowest quality layer untouched, we are able to add a copyright notice (g. 1c). A resolution scalable

fragile watermark must allow authentication at low resolutions, but should not permit arbitrary
changes to higher resolutions, which frequently contain important edge information. Similarly, a

quality scalable fragile watermark must not only allow authentication at the lowest quality layer,
but should also protect higher quality layers.

1.2

Our Work

Scenario:

Consider a company that oers an image collection online via a subscription service.

The images are scalably compressed using JPEG2000 so that subscribers may access these images

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 1: (a) Zoomed view of the original image, (b) the aeroplane's text is modied to read "CHINA
SOUTHERN" without changing the lowest resolution layer, (c) a copyright mark c J. Citizen is

inserted without changing the lowest quality layer

at the resolution and quality that best suits their display and bandwidth preferences. The company
stores a single copy of each image on the server and each subscriber uses a watermark detector
to check the integrity of a received image. The images are not intended to be altered in any way
other than by the scaling that is required by users. No operation other than resolution and quality
scaling is permitted, and malicious tampering must be detected.
In the following we outline our main contributions that consist of: a framework for the evaluation of scalable watermarking systems used for image authentication in the scenario above, and
a scalable watermarking algorithm that can be used for authentication of images in this scenario,
tolerating both resolution and quality scaling.
Framework

We propose two required properties for scalable fragile watermarks:

Detectability requires that detection algorithm should be able to detect tampering in a highlyscaled image. A fragile watermark that satises detectability:

• tolerates scaling as an allowed operation
• protects the base layer from tampering.

Graceful Improvement is intended to ensure that higher resolution and quality layers are also
protected by the watermark, so tampering in higher layers, and not just the base layer, must
be detected. More specically, the more important a given layer is to the image, the larger the
portion of the watermark that should be devoted to that layer. A fragile watermark with graceful
improvement

• protects all higher layers from tampering
• protects each layer according to its contribution to the image
A scalable fragile watermarking algorithm for authentication must provide the above properties
against a range of attacks. Attacks include not only simple forms of tampering, but also more
sophisticated attacks. In this paper we consider simple tampering in both the spatial and transform
domains, as well as mark transfer, Holliman-Memon, and collage attacks (section 2.2.3). These are
the most important known attacks.
Algorithm

We present a scalable fragile watermarking algorithm specically for JPEG2000 com-

pressed images. Our algorithm satises the important properties of a scalable watermarking algorithm, detectability and graceful improvement, and is secure against sophisticated attacks. To
provide detectability, features constructed from the lowest resolution and quality layers are embedded in those layers. To allow graceful improvement (and prevent the attacks of section 1.1), other

features include (and are embedded in) higher resolution and quality layers. These features are
designed to maximize tamper sensitivity while maintaining both scalability and security against
attacks. To eliminate false alarms we ensure that for any untampered resolution or quality scaled
image, there will be an exact match between the candidate watermark bits (that are expected to
be present in the image), and the extracted ones. Comparison of the candidate and extracted
watermark bits is only performed on bits that can be correctly recovered. Watermark synchronisation is maintained through careful indexing and selection of coecients. To prevent mark

transfer, Holliman-Memon and collage attacks, watermark construction is based on features from
pseudorandomly selected coecients that are not restricted to within a block. This ensures the
watermark is neither image nor blockwise independent, and that the dependencies cannot be easily
determined by an attacker. These features are provided even at resolution scaling to

1
1024 th

the

1
area of the original or at quality scaling to compression rate 0.01 ( 100
th the le size). We present

the design approach and the details of the algorithm in section 3 and show, in the experiments of
section 4, that our algorithm achieves all of the design goals.

Importance of our work: Authentication guarantee for a wide range of scaling in the resolution
and quality domains is a non-trivial task. The overwhelming majority of previous works focused
on scalable watermarking, discussed below, have been robust watermarks. Existing compressiontolerant semi-fragile watermarks protect only the lower layer and so do not satisfy graceful improvement, provide scalability in one domain, or require the domain of scaling to be known before
embedding. (More details below.) That is, no existing algorithm can provide resolution and quality
scalability simultaneously. Our work gives such an algorithm and evaluates its properties using a
well dened set of requirements and an evaluation framework.

1.3

Related Work

Almost all watermarks that specically consider scalability [21, 19, 1, 10, 16] are robust watermarks
that are used for copyright protection. For authentication purposes, fragility is required. The only
known algorithm designed for both scalability and fragility is due to Steinder et al. [18]. It allows
detection in any scaled image that contains the lowest resolution layer, satisfying the detectability
property. However, as its authors note, the algorithm will falsely authenticate a tampered image
provided the lowest layer is unmodied.
There are semi-fragile watermarks that allow scaling. Unlike our algorithm, these permit
changes such as recompression, blurring, sharpening etc. Sun et al. [20] provide an algorithm
which permits resolution or quality scaling. However authentication is only for the least authen-

ticable bit rate (LABR), which essentially describes the least acceptable scaled image, so higher

resolution or quality layers may be freely manipulated. Furthermore, the user must specify the
type of scaling during embedding or suer a dramatic drop in tamper sensitivity.
The closest work to our own is the semi-fragile algorithm of Schlauweg et al. [15]. It allows
resolution scaling, and like our algorithm, protects all resolution layers from manipulation. It also
allows quality scaling (down to a given bit-plane) but, unlike our algorithm, does not protect higher
bit planes from manipulation. Also like our algorithm, Schlauweg et al. provide security against
mark-transfer and Holliman-Memon style attacks. However, they state that they completely sacrice tamper localization in order to achieve this.
As noted by Meerwald and Uhl [12], any algorithm that is robust to compression will support
some degree of quality scalability. Other semi-fragile watermarking algorithms [4, 8, 11], although
not designed to allow scaling, have been designed tolerate scalable compression. However, like
Sun et al., these algorithms also take the approach of authenticating the LABR only. Thus, if the
LABR is set suciently low as to allow detectability at low quality layers, higher quality layers are
not protected.

2

Evaluation Framework

To evaluate a scalable fragile algorithm one must consider scalability, security and tamper location.
The atermarking system that we consider in this paper consist of two algorithms: an embed-

ding algorithm, which takes an image and a secret key, and uses them to construct and insert a
watermark; and a detection algorithm, which takes the secret key and a candidate image, extracts
the watermark and compares it to a candidate watermark (what we expect to extract from an
untampered image). The candidate image is assumed to be authentic if the extracted watermark
correctly matches the candidate watermark. The bit error rate (BER) measures the fraction of
extracted watermark bits that do not match their counterpart candidate watermark bits

BER =

2.1

mismatching extracted bits
.
total extracted bits

Scalability

To assess scalability, we will evaluate both detectability and graceful improvement, as dened in
section 1.2, by applying scaling to a set of scalably compressed watermarked images (see section 4
for experiment details).
Detectability

For detectability, an algorithm should tolerate resolution and quality scaling and

protect the base layer from tampering.

If the algorithm tolerates scaling, the BER should be zero when only valid scaling operations
have been applied. If it protects the base layer from tampering, the BER of a 1-layer scaled image
(containing the base layer only) should be non-zero after an attack that aects the base layer.
Graceful Improvement

For graceful improvement, an algorithm should protect all higher layers

from tampering and protect each layer in proportion to its contribution to the image.
If the algorithm protects higher layers from tampering, the BER of a scaled image with one or
more renement layers should be non-zero after an attack that aects those renement layers.
Determining whether each layer is protected in proportion to its contribution to the image is
more complex. We determine the ideal number of watermark bits appropriate to each (resolution
or quality) layer l, and compare them to the numbers of correctly extracted watermark bits in each
layer.
The number of correctly extracted watermark bits l , in each layer l, is simply counted during
watermark detection. The ideal number of bits in layer l is dened as

ιl = N

P l − P l−1
,
Pf − Pe

where N is the number of embedded bits, and P f , P e and P l represent the PSNR values of the
full (all layers), empty (mid-grey), and l-layer images. The t between the ideal and extracted
watermark bits is measured by

∆=

X (l − ιl )2
l

ιl

.

This is then normalised to the range [0, 1] to produce the nal graceful improvement measure G ,
so that a value of 1 indicates a perfect t to the ideal, while 0 indicates the worst possible t

G =1−

∆
N ( ιNm

− 1)

where m is the non-empty layer that contributes least to image quality.2

2.2

Security

When we say that an algorithm should have non-zero BER after an attack, we do not simply mean
tampering in the spatial domain but also more sophisticated attacks. We describe the attack model
by which tamper detection ability is tested.
2 See [14] for a more complete discussion of the concept behind this measure in the context of robust watermarking

(Ch. 3) or for the details of the normalisation procedure (App. B.1).

2.2.1

Attacker's Goal

An attacker's aim is to alter the image so as to fool both the human receiver and the watermark
detector. To constitute a successful attack, the tampered image must be meaningfully dierent from
the watermarked image, be of acceptable visual quality, and produce zero BER during detection.
2.2.2

Attacker's Capabilities

We assume that the attacker access to one (or more) compressed watermarked images and the
associated compression parameters but does not have access to either the original unwatermarked
image(s) or the secret key.
2.2.3

Attack Strategies

The attacker may try one of several possible strategies (listed in increasing order of sophistication):
Tampering in the spatial domain

The watermarked image is decompressed and modied

in the spatial domain before recompression. Because our algorithm is designed to be fragile to
recompression, detection of spatial domain tampering can be tested using the recompression step
alone.
Tampering in the wavelet domain

The watermark image is decoded, wavelet coecients are

modied, and the image is re-encoded. This type of tampering is not explicitly evaluated, as both
collage and watermark transfer attacks are applied in the wavelet domain.
Watermark transferral

The attacker attempts to copy the watermark bits from the water-

marked coecients to the tampered coecients (see e.g. [9]). The attacker must know the watermarking algorithm.
Holliman-Memon attack

The attacker exploits the blockwise independence of the watermark-

ing algorithm to produce a counterfeit image by replacing tampered blocks with the most similar
block in the same equivalence class (see [5] for details), from the valid watermarked image.
Collage attack

A more sophisticated form of Holliman-Memon attack by Fridrich et al. [2], in

which the attacker replaces tampered pixels in the watermarked image with the most similar pixel
at the same location from other watermarked images. The attacker must know the watermarking
algorithm and have access to multiple images that use the same secret key. We apply the wavelet

domain version of this attack, replacing tampered coecients (with the most similar coecient at
the same index), rather than tampered pixels.

2.3

Tamper Location

In addition to tamper detection against known attacks, an authentication watermark should provide
tamper location. We use tampering in the wavelet domain to alter a single pixel in the watermarked
image, and show the estimated tampered region.

3

The Proposed Algorithm

3.1

Objectives

Our goal is to develop a scalable fragile watermarking algorithm, suitable for the authentication
of JPEG2000 compressed images.
The watermarking algorithm should be both resolution and quality scalable, satisfying detectability and graceful improvement as described in section 2, without requiring the type of scalability to be chosen in advance. This means that scaling should be tolerated (producing minimal
false alarms), that a `reasonable' number of watermark bits should be present in the lowest resolution and quality layers and that all layers should be protected, according to their contributions
in perceptual quality towards the full image.
It should be otherwise fragile, detecting illicit changes to the watermarked image. In particular,
the attacks described in section 2 should not result in a meaningful alteration to the watermarked
image that is of acceptable visual quality without causing mismatches between candidate and
extracted bits. Furthermore, the approximate locations of alterations should be deducible from
the locations of the mismatched watermark bits.

3.2

Design

The watermarking algorithm consists of the algorithms Embed(I, sk, Λ) and Detect(I ∗ , sk, Λ),
where I represents the original image, I ∗ a potentially altered image, sk a secret key, and Λ a
set of additional public parameters (sect. 3.3).
Algorithm Overview

The watermark is embedded in selected wavelet coecients, during JPEG2000 compression of
the image I , directly after the quantization step. Each coecient in the image is assigned an

index i which is used to generate pseudorandom numbers that are required by the watermarking
algorithm. For each selected coecient vi , a watermark element ui is generated and then embedded
using quantize-and-replace embedding.
Each watermark element ui consists of ji bits. First, the number of watermark bits ji is determined, according to the index i and value of the coecient vi using global and local parameters.
Then each watermark bit ui, κ is generated as described below, where 0 ≤ κ < ji
Each watermark bit carefully constructed from the image coecients, to ensure high levels
of scalability and security against attack. First a pseudorandom sequence of image coecients,
termed a `feature sequence', is selected. The elements of the feature sequence are then quantized.
Finally, the watermark bit is constructed using the signs and relative magnitudes of the quantized
feature coecients. This allows us to maintain good tamper sensitivity at all levels of scaling.
Detection of the watermark, in a possibly modied candidate image I ∗ , begins with the same
selection, indexing and watermark generation procedures as the embedding algorithm. The number
of missing bits mi , lost from each coecient vi∗ due to scaling, is then determined, using information
from the JPEG2000 bitstream and headers. The generated watermark is adjusted to produce the
candidate watermark, by marking any watermark bits constructed based on missing coecient
bits as invalid. The embedded watermark is extracted by taking the ji least signicant bits, and
any extracted bits which have been identied as missing are also marked as invalid. Finally,
the candidate and extracted watermarks are compared. If the image is scaled, but otherwise
untampered, then all valid bits of candidate watermark and their corresponding extracted bits will
match. If a mismatch of even one bit occurs, then the image is regarded as tampered.
The algorithm steps are given in Figure 2. The individual steps of the algorithms are discussed
below.
3.2.1

Watermark Embedding

Select_Coefficients
Signicant wavelet coecients are selected during JPEG2000 compression of the image I , directly
after the quantization step. The set of selected coecients contains all coecients in I with
magnitudes greater than or equal to the threshold 2n , where n ∈ N is a system parameter. The use
of a selection threshold that is a power of two ensures that any coecient v that is not completely
lost due to scaling will be selected during detection.

Embed:
Input:

Detect:
I, sk, Λ

Output:

Input:

I0

vi , I ∗ , sk, Λ

Output:

True or False

Select_Coefficients

Select_Coefficients

Index_Coefficients

Index_Coefficients

For each selected coecient vi

For each coecient vi∗

ui = Generate_Watermark(i)

u∗i = Generate_Watermark(vi∗ )

vi0 = Embed_Watermark(ui , vi )

mi = Determine_no_of_Missing_Bits(I ∗ , vi∗ )
uci = Adjust_Candidate_Watermark(u∗i )
udi = Extract_Watermark(vi∗ )

Compare uci = udi
Generate_Watermark:
Input:

Generate_Watermark_Bit:

i, I, sk, Λ

Output:

Input:

ui

i, κ, I, sk, Λ

Output:

ui,κ

ji = Determine_no_of_Watermark_Bits(vi∗ )

Select_Feature_Sequence

For each watermark bit

Quantize_Feature_Coefficients

ui κ = Generate_Watermark_Bit(i, κ)
Figure 2:
and

Compute_Watermark_Bit

Outline of the watermark embedding and detection algorithms Embed(I, sk, Λ)

Detect(I ∗ , sk, Λ),

along

with

the

subroutines

Generate_Watermark(i)

and

Generate_Watermark_Bit(i, κ).
Index_Coefficients
Each coecient in the image I is assigned an index i which is used to generate the pseudorandom
numbers that are required for watermark generation. Coecients are indexed using a raster scan
of each subband in each component of each resolution layer, from lowest to highest.
For example, given an 80 × 80 colour image with 4 resolution layers, the lowest resolution layer
(10×10) would be indexed using 0 to 99 for the Y component, 100 to 199 for the Cb component, and

200 to 299 for the Cr component; followed by the LH, HL and HH subbands of the Y component
of layer 1, with indices 300 to 599; and so on.
Because the indices are based on position within the image grid, changes to the coecient
values due to quality scaling will not aect their indices. Similarly, because lower resolution layers
are indexed before higher ones, the loss of resolution layers due to scaling willl not aect the indices

of the remaining coecients (in lower layers).

Embed_Watermark
Once the required watermark bits have been generated (see the following section), each ji -bit
watermark element ui is embedded using quantization and replacement

vi0


|vi | ji
= sign(vi ) ji 2 + ui
2


(1)

where sign(vi ) = ±1 and |vi | is the absolute value of vi . This is done for all selected coecients
to produce the full (i.e. not scaled) watermarked image I 0 .
3.2.2

Watermark Generation

Determine_no_of_Watermark_Bits
For each coecient vi we determine the number of least signicant bits ji that should be replaced
by watermark bits during embedding. A global parameter α is used to control the overall strength
of the watermark.
Watermark imperceptibility is improved by using a local embedding strength proportional (Weber's Law) to the coecient magnitude. However, the magnitude of the original coecient is not
known at the detector, so αi is set to 2β , where β is the smallest non-negative integer satisfying

2β >

|vi |
2 .

This formulation relies only on knowledge of the most signicant bit of the selected

coecient, so even if all less signicant bits are lost during scaling, the correct value of αi can be
recovered. Thus αi serves as an approximation to |vi | that is obtainable from any selected coefcient in the original image, the watermarked image and any resolution or quality scaled version
thereof.
To resist high levels of quality scaling, it would be desirable to embed uniformly strongly in
all coecients, however this would compromise the imperceptibility of the watermark. On the
other hand, reducing the watermark strength uniformly across all coecients would compromise
robustness to high levels of scaling. We use a pseudorandom number g(sk, i) 7→ [0, 1) to reduce
the watermark strength non-uniformly. This enables greater resistance to high levels of scaling
for a given level of image degradation. Furthermore, since ji and αi are natural numbers, the use
of a real-valued g(sk, i) allows ner control over the image degradation (via adjustments to the
strength parameter α) than would otherwise be possible.
The watermark ui to be embedded in coecient vi will be ji bits in length, where

ji = max (0, blog2 (ααi g(sk, i))c + 1)

(2)

3.2.3

Watermark Bit Generation

Select_Feature_Sequence
The κth watermark bit ui,κ of ui is constructed using a feature sequence

Vi,κ = {vi,κ,1 , vi,κ,2 , ..., vi,κ,η }

(3)

of length η ∈ Λ, which consists of pseudorandomly selected image coecients, and provides some
assurance that these coecients remain untampered.
Each feature sequence is pseudorandomly chosen to be one of two types. An intra-codeblock
sequence is selected entirely from coecients in the same codeblock as the watermark bit, while an

intra-resolution sequence is selected from coecients anywhere within the same resolution layer as
the watermark bit.
Intra-codeblock sequences provide tamper location, as all feature coecients are in the same
spatial neighbourhood. They also allow us to easily identify a quantization stepsize that will ensure
excellent tamper sensitivity while maintaining robustness to scaling. However, because they are
entirely from within a single spatial region, they oer no security against Holliman-Memon style
attacks.
Intra-resolution sequences provide security against Holliman-Memon attacks by creating dependencies which span multiple codeblocks. However this comes at the expense of tamper location,
because tampering with the sequence will be indicated at spatially disparate points. Furthermore,
because the feature coecients are not from the same codeblock as the watermark bit, a coarser
quantization stepsize is required to improve feature availability after quality scaling, which reduces
tamper sensitivity.3 Using a mix of both types of sequences provides security against attack, but
retains good tamper sensitivity and some tamper location.
Both the sequence type (intra-codeblock or intra-resolution) and the individual feature coefcients are selected pseudorandomly based on a hash of the key sk and the Φ most signicant
bit-planes of the lowest resolution layer of the image. This ensures that an attacker, who does not
know the key sk , cannot compute the feature sequence that corresponds to a given watermark bit.
Furthermore, it ensures that replacement using coecients from one or more images watermarked
with the same key will fail unless all images have the same hash value, thereby defeating the mark
transfer and collage attacks. Note that only the Φ most signicant bit-planes of the lowest resolution layer are used to compute the hash. This allows the correct hash value to be computed from
any resolution scaled image, and any quality scaled image of acceptable quality.
3 To ensure that feature coecients are available after resolution scaling, this type of feature sequence is chosen

from anywhere within the same resolution as the watermark bit, rather than from anywhere within any resolution.

Quantize_Feature_Coefficients
The xth feature coecient, vi, κ, x is quantized by 2qi, κ, x before the watermark bit is computed.
This increases feature availability under quality scaling, by ensuring that least signicant bits
(which are likely to be lost during quality scaling) do not form part of the feature.4 This is
essential because correct reconstruction of a watermark bit requires that the same features used to
compute the watermark bit must be available at the detector, even after some least signicant bits
have been lost. Ideally, whenever a watermark bit is available at the detector (i.e. has not been lost
due to scaling), the features used to compute that bit will also be available so that verication can
occur. To help achieve this, the value of the quantization stepsize exponent qi, κ, x is determined
dierently depending upon the sequence type.
For intra-codeblock quantization, a stepsize exponent of

qi, κ, x = κ + 1

(4)

is used. This exploits a guarantee of JPEG2000 codestreams that if a bit from a given bit plane in
a codeblock is received, then all more signicant bit-planes in that codeblock have been received.
Thus if the κth least signicant watermark bit ui, κ is received, then all bit-planes greater than

κ in the same codeblock are recoverable. This allows the maximum possible feature sensitivity
at all levels of quality scaling, while still ensuring that all features are available whenever the
corresponding watermark bit is available.
For intra-resolution sequences there is no similar guarantee, so a large quantization stepsize is
required. A stepsize exponent of

qi, κ, x = Mi, κ, x − b


ji − 1 − κ
c−1
a

(5)

is used, where Mi, κ, x represents the maximum number of signicant bit-planes in the subband
containing the feature coecient vi, κ, x that is being quantized. The parameter a controls how
quickly feature sensitivity is increased as the plane κ, of the watermark bit ui, κ , decreases.
This quantization stage should also remove any bits of the feature coecient which will be
altered during watermark embedding. Thus if a feature coecient vi, κ, x belongs to the set of
selected coecients, and the quantization stepsize for its feature type was not suciently large to
remove all ji, κ, x watermark bits, then vi, κ, x is instead quantized by 2ji, κ, x .

Compute_Watermark_Bit
For each quantized feature coecient Q(vi, κ, x ) we construct a sign feature and a magnitude feature.
4 Selecting the feature sequence from same resolution layer as the watermark bit has already ensured that reso-

lution scaling will not aect feature availability.

The sign feature si, κ, x is simply the sign bit of vi, κ, x .


0 if vi, κ, x ≥ 0
si, κ, x =

1 if v
i, κ, x < 0.

(6)

The magnitude feature is whether the quantized magnitude of the xth feature coecient vi, κ, x is
greater than that of the preceding5 feature coecient vi, κ, x−1 in the sequence.


0 if |Q(vi, κ, x−1 )| ≤ |Q(vi, κ, x )|
mi, κ, x =

1 if |Q(v
i, κ, x−1 )| > |Q(vi, κ, x )|

(7)

The watermark bit ui, κ is formed by XORing all sign and magnitude features from its feature
sequence.

ui, κ =

η
M

si, κ, x ⊕ mi, κ, x



(8)

x=1

This essentially establishes a pair of inequalities (one for the sign and one for the magnitude)
for each coecient in the feature sequence. The watermark bit will change in value if an odd
number of these inequalities are violated. The avoids the problem that occurs with a simple XOR
of all bits in the quantized feature coeicents, which generally allows tampering by ipping pairs
of bits within a coecient.
3.2.4

Watermark Detection

When a possibly modied image I ∗ is received, the detection algorithm Detect(I ∗ , sk, Λ) extracts
a watermark ud from I ∗ and generates a candidate watermark uc , then compares the candidate
and extracted marks. To ensure that any bits which have been aected by scaling are not included
in the comparison, the number of bits missing from each coecient due to scaling are determined,
and corresponding watermark bits are marked as invalid.
The procedures to select coecients, index coecients and generate candidate watermark elements are the same as those used during embedding, and are described in previous sections. After
these procedures have been applied, the number of missing bits is calculated and the candidate
and extracted watermark elements are produced accordingly.

Determine_no_of_Missing_Bits
We determine the number of missing bits mi for each coecient vi , in order to correctly adjust
the candidate watermark. This requires the numbers Mi , Zi and Pi , which can easily be obtained
from the JPEG2000 headers and bitstream.
5 For these purposes, the feature sequence is deemed to `wrap around' so that the rst coecient in the feature

sequence is preceded by the last coecient in the sequence.

The QCC or QCD marker segments contain the JPEG2000 quantization exponent Ei and the
number of guard bits Gi , which allow us to determine6 the maximum number of bit-planes
(9)

Mi = Ei + Gi − 1

that can be expected from the codestream for the subband containing the received coecient vi∗ .
If the rst Zi bitplanes of the codeblock containing vi∗ are all zero, these bitplanes are not
explicitly encoded in the JPEG2000 bitstream. Each explicitly-encoded bitplane will be present in
the bitstream as three coding passes, with the exception of the rst bitplane, for which only one
coding pass is used. Thus for an unscaled image, we would receive 3(Mi − Zi − 1) + 1 coding passes.
The number of received passes Pi will often be less than this when quality scaling has occurred.7
Provided only JPEG2000 resolution and/or quality scaling has occurred, the number of missing
magnitude bits from the coecient vi∗ can be precisely determined from these values in combination
with the value of vi∗ itself. This is done using the formula8

 
Pi
mi = Mi − Zi − 1 −
3




1
if Pi ≡ 2 (mod 3)





Pi


and v̄i∗ = 2(Mi −Zi −1−b 3 c)
−


−1 if Pi ≡ 0 (mod 3) and vi∗ = 0






0
otherwise.

(10)

Adjust_Candidate_Watermark
If enough bits of all feature coecients are present9 that it is possible to reconstruct the quantized feature coecients (and thence the correct sign and magnitude features), then the candidate
watermark bit is simply the watermark bit u∗i generated from the image I ∗ as for embedding.
If, however, the number of bits mising from any coecient vi,∗ κ, x in the feature sequence is
suciently large as to interfere with the value of the quantized feature coecient Q(vi,∗ κ, x ), then
generation of corresponding candidate watermark bit is compromised. In these circumstances, the
candidate watermark bit is deemed invalid (denoted uci, κ =⊥).
6 See [6] annex E, pg. 105106.
7 Ibid., annex B.9, pg. 61 The packet headers list Z explicitly, as the `number of "insignicant" most signicant
i

bit-planes'. Pi is easily constructed from the `number of coding passes for each code-block in this packet' across all
received packets.
8 Ibid., annex D , pg. 93104, by careful examination.
9 This is guaranteed to occur with intra-codeblock feature sequences, due to the design of the feature quantization
stepsize, but will not necessarily occur for intra-resolution sequences.

That is, if we let Vi,∗κ be the feature sequence associated with the candidate watermark bit

uci, κ , then

uci, κ =



u∗i

if ∀vi,∗ κ, x ∈ Vi,∗κ


⊥

if @vi,∗ κ, x ∨ mi, κ, x > qi,∗ κ, x .

mi, κ, x ≤ qi,∗ κ, x

(11)

Note that in a scaled but otherwise untampered image, either the coecient vi,∗ κ, x will have been
completely lost (denoted @vi,∗ κ, x ) or the quantization stepsize exponent qi,∗ κ, x calculated during
watermark extraction will equal the one qi, κ, x used during embedding. Therefore the watermark
bit will match the candidate watermark bit, provided neither is invalid.
By adjusting the candidate watermark at the detector according to the level of scaling that
has actually occurred, rather than attempting to adjust the watermark at the embedding stage to
allow for all levels of scaling, this algorithm is able to tolerate high levels of scaling yet remain
sensitive to illicit changes in less highly-scaled images.

Extract_Watermark
The watermark extraction process is essentially the reverse of watermark embedding, with the
exception that any watermark bit that is missing due to scaling is identied and deemed invalid
(denoted udi, κ =⊥).
∗
Thus if vi,κ
represents the κth watermark bit that would be extracted from vi∗ if we did not

account for scaling, the extracted watermark bit is


∗
vi,κ
if mi ≤ κ < ji
vi,∗ κ =

⊥ . if κ < m or κ ≥ j
i
i

(12)

Compare
If both the extracted watermark bit udi, κ and the candidate watermark bit uci, κ are deemed valid,
they are compared. If every pair of corresponding candidate and extracted watermark bits uci κ
and udiκ that is compared produces a match, we conclude that the image has not been modied. If
even a single pair does not match, then we may conclude that the image has been tampered with


True if ∀i : uci 6=⊥ ∧ udi 6=⊥, uci = udi
Output =
(13)

False if ∃i : uc 6=⊥ ∧ ud 6=⊥, uc 6= ud .
i
i
This strictness is possible because in a JPEG2000 scaled, but otherwise untampered image,
an exact match between ud and uc is guaranteed by the following two points. If a coecient is

completely lost10 due to scaling, then it will fail the coecient selection rule (section 3.2.1) and
thus no attempt will be made to extract udi nor calculate uci . If a coecient is partially lost, the
number of bits mi that are missing will be determined, and the corresponding bits from in both
the candidate and extracted watermarks will be marked as invalid, and thus not included in the
comparison.
If a mismatch between uci κ and udiκ occurs, it must be a result of changes to either the coecient

vi∗ and/or one or more of the associated feature coecients vi,∗ κ, x ∈ Vi,∗κ , but it is not possible to
determine which coecients were changed. As a result, all these coecients are marked as suspect.
Because these coecients may be dispersed spatially across the entire image, tamper location relies
on nding a concentration of suspect coecients in a given spatial region. This is discussed in more
detail in section 4.3.

3.3

Parameters

The detection algorithm requires the secret key sk used in embedding, and additional parameters

Λ = {n, Φ, η, a, α}. The secret key sk is used in both feature and watermark sequence generation,
and its length can be chosen to suit the required level of security. The parameters Λ will be around
48 bits and can be sent using a public channel such as the image header.
The exponent n (4 bits) controls the coecient selection threshold. Higher values reduce
complexity and watermark perceptibility at the cost of tamper sensitivity. The number Φ (4 bits),
of most signicant bit-planes from the lowest resolution layer to be hashed, controls how similar
two images must be before identical secret keys will result in identical feature sequences. Higher
values increase security at the cost of reducing quality scalability. The parameter η (5 bits) controls
the number of coecients used in each feature sequence. Higher values increase security against
Holliman-Memon attacks, but reduce tamper location ability and may cause reduced sensitivity
under quality scaling (because all η coecients must be present before the watermark bit can be
veried). The robustness parameter a (3 bits) controls the tradeo between quality scalability
and feature sensitivity. High values maintain coarse features, low values produce increasingly
ne features as the watermark bit approaches the LSB. The parameter α (32 bits) controls the
watermark embedding strength. Low values favour imperceptibility, high values favour robustness
and tamper sensitivity.
10 We say a coecient is

remain.

completely lost

if no magnitude bits remain, and

partially lost

if some magnitude bits
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Experimental Evaluation

For this evaluation we use 20 original images and 10 embedding keys, to produce 200 watermarked,
scalably compressed images. Watermarking occurs during JPEG2000 compression, with 6 resolution layers and 6 quality layers with compression rates 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05 and 0.9999. At
these settings, the base resolution layer has
layer has

1
100 th

1
1024 th

the original image area and the base quality

the original le size. The watermarking parameters are n = 3, η = 4, a = 1,

and Φ = 1 for all images. The value of α is varied according to the image to allow a consistent
perceptual quality

11 .

Figure 3 shows our original image, and the corresponding image produced using the above
settings. The psnr values between the original and the compressed watermarked image are approximately 40, 40 and 38 dB for the red, green and blue channels respectively.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 3: (a) The original image, (b) the JPEG2000 compressed watermarked image, (c) resolution
scaled, (d) quality scaled
To demonstrate scalability and security according to the framework in section 2, we report the
average BER for untampered and attacked images at all levels of scaling, in tables 1 and 2, and
the average graceful improvement values G , in table 3.
11 Specically, α is adjusted so that the 99th percentile of the S-CIELAB [22] CIEDE 2000 [17] error is xed at

4∆E , for a Dell 1702FP (Analog) monitor, 96dpi, viewed at 46cm.

Average BER after Resolution Scaling
No Attack

Spatial

Transfer

Collage

1 layer

0.00

0.46

0.49

0.41

2 layers

0.00

0.48

0.49

0.39

3 layers

0.00

0.49

0.49

0.38

4 layers

0.00

0.48

0.49

0.37

5 layers

0.00

0.48

0.48

0.36

6 layers

0.00

0.47

0.48

0.36

Table 1: Average bit error rate for 200 watermarked images after dierent attacks and levels of
resolution scaling

Average BER after Quality Scaling
No Attack

Spatial

Transfer

Collage

1 layer

0.00

0.29

0.46

0.35

2 layers

0.00

0.34

0.47

0.35

3 layers

0.00

0.38

0.47

0.35

4 layers

0.00

0.40

0.47

0.36

5 layers

0.00

0.41

0.48

0.36

6 layers

0.00

0.47

0.48

0.36

Table 2: Average bit error rate for 200 watermarked images after dierent attacks and levels of
quality scaling

Average Graceful Improvement (G)
Resolution Scaling

0.94

Quality Scaling

0.86

Table 3: Average graceful improvement values for 200 watermarked images under resolution and
quality scaling.

4.1
4.1.1

Scalability
Detectability

The algorithm tolerates scaling, with a BER of zero on an untampered image at all levels of
resolution and quality scaling (No Attack, tables 1 and 2). It also protects both the base resolution

and base quality layers from tampering (1 layer, tables 1 and 2), detecting spatial, mark transfer
and collage attacks. Thus the algorithm satises both resolution and quality detectability.
4.1.2

Graceful Improvement

The algorithm not only protects the base layer but also higher layers (26 layers, tables 1 and
2), with non-zero BER after spatial, mark transfer and collage attacks. The watermark is fairly
well distributed amongst the dierent image layers, relative to their contributions to perceptual
quality, with graceful improvement values (table 3) reasonably close to 1, although quality graceful
improvement suers from the diculty of imperceptibly embedding in the base quality layer.
This allows the detection of attacks in which only the higher layers are modied, such as those
in gure 1, as shown in gures 4a4d.

4.2

Security

The algorithm is secure against all known attacks. Spatial domain, mark transfer and collage
attacks were all tested explicitly and, although the BERs reported in tables 1 and 2 are averages,
tampering was detected in all 200 images, for each attack, at all tested levels of resolution and
quality scaling.
While not explicitly tested, security against wavelet domain tampering and Holliman-Memon
attacks is also provided. The feature sensitivity and image dependence that ensure security against
mark transfer attacks also ensures security against less sophisticated tampering in the wavelet
domain.12 Similarly, the block interdependence that ensures security against collage attacks also
ensures security against the less sophisticated Holliman-Memon attack.

4.3

Tamper Location

Some sample attacks and their corresponding detection results are shown in gure 4. Figures 4a
and 4c show wavelet attacks on the higher resolution layers and higher quality layers, respectively,
as described in section 1.1 and shown in gure 1. Figure 4e shows the same change made to the
aeroplane as gure 4a, but this time using a 50 image collage attack. In each case, the attack is
detected but only its approximate location can be identied.
This occurs because in order to achieve the required security, each watermark bit is computed
from several coecients across dierent spatial regions of the image rather than from individual
coecients or localised blocks. This sacrices tamper location, as a mismatched watermark bit
12 Because we use a wavelet domain watermark, mark transfer attacks are applied in the wavelet domain and thus

may be considered as a sophisticated form of tampering in the wavelet domain.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

Figure 4: Attacked image and tamper detection result pairs: (a)&(b) wavelet attack of g. 1b on
higher resolution layers, (c)&(d) wavelet attack of g. 1c on higher quality layers, (e)&(f) collage
attack on plane text, (g)&(h) mark transfer to new image
causes all coecients in the corresponding feature sequence to be marked as `tampered'. Tamper
location therefore relies on a concentration of `tampered' coecients in a local area, against a less

concentrated background of `tampered' coecients spread across the image.
Figures 5a and 5b show a single-pixel modication in the wavelet domain, with the detection
result in gure 5c. If mark transfer or collage attacks are applied in a small region, the results are
similar. Note that although the attack is concentrated in a very small spatial area, the precision
of tamper location is poor. This is because the small spatial change causes changes to surrounding
low resolution coecients, which obscure the concentration of high-resolution coecients in the
tamper detection image. This problem can be eliminated by removing the low resolution tamper
data from the tamper detection image 5d. However, small modications using spatial domain
tampering (g. 5e) cannot be located, though they are detected (g. 5f), as the recompression step
causes widespread changes to the image.

5

Conclusion

We have provided a resolution and quality scalable fragile watermarking algorithm for image authentication.
Unlike most semi-fragile authentication watermarks in the literature, our algorithm generates
some image features using layers above the lowest authenticable bit rate. This prevents an attacker
from freely modifying higher layers, which is particularly important for highly scalable images where
the lowest authenticable bit rate contains only a small fraction of the data contained in the full
image.
Our algorithm is robust to resolution and quality scaling. By design, it generates zero false
alarms due to JPEG2000 resolution or quality scaling for otherwise untampered images and experimental results conrm this at all tested levels of scaling.
It is fragile to other alterations, including any spatial manipulations, which involve recompression of the watermarked image and collage and mark transfer attacks in the wavelet domain.
Our algorithm also provides some degree of tamper location. However, because multiple pseudorandomly selected feature coecients are associated with each watermark bit, it is dicult to
locate changes precisely using this algorithm. We rely on the assumption that most malicious
tampering will alter multiple pixels in a small image region, resulting in a higher concentration
of watermark errors in that region relative to the more random errors in surrounding areas of the
image.
A small amount of scalability has been sacriced for security. The inclusion of the Φ most
signicant bit-planes of the lowest resolution layer in the hash used for feature sequence selection
makes it harder for an attacker to use multiple images with the same secret key to determine

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

Figure 5: (a) A single pixel of the watermarked image is modied in the wavelet domain, (b) zoomed
view of the modication, (c) tamper detection result, (d) tamper detection result not including
low resolution coecients (e) single pixel modication in spatial domain and recompression, (f)
tamper detection result
coecient sequences. However this means that these bit-planes must all be correct before the
candidate watermark will be correctly generated. Thus any quality scaling that is suciently severe
to result in an incorrect bit amongst the Φ most signicant bit-planes of the lowest resolution layer
will cause the algorithm to fail. This seems a reasonable sacrice, as the importance of these
bit-planes to image quality is such that it is unlikely that such extreme scaling would result in an
image of acceptable quality. Finally, because the value of Φ is a parameter of the system, it is
possible to adjust the balance between security and scalability by choosing an appropriate value
for Φ.

The main concept behind our algorithm is that it is not necessary to treat loss due to scaling as if it were noise, because the locations of the lost bits can be precisely identied at the
detector. Thus, rather than restricting the embedding region to a specic level of scaling, it is
possible to embed a watermark to protect the full image and then generate an appropriately reduced candidate watermark during detection if scaling has occurred. This concept is not specic
to authentication watermarking and, with appropriate error correction measures, might also be
adapted to applications such as message embedding.
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